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After the TRC: Citizenship, Memory, and Reconciliation

Rosemary Nagy

Abstract

Pour comprendre le sens de citoyenneté dans la “nouvelle” Afrique du Sud, il faut le placer dans la perspective de la justice transitionnelle. Normalement, ces deux catégories sont sans relations l’une avec l’autre. Cet article établit les grandes lignes de la relation conceptuelle entre citoyenneté, d’une part, et mémoire et réconciliation, d’autre part, et, en illustration, se sert de l’accroissement d’une violente xénophobie et du débat sur les réparations. Il soutient que le sens de l’injustice est important parce que d’une part, il fait s’entrecouper mémoire et réconciliation, d’autre part, il offre un lien éthique nécessaire, tout en respectant la différence entre les deux.

Introduction

Truth and reconciliation — South Africa’s main undertaking of transitional justice — largely figured during the first two years of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s (TRC’s) operation, from 1996 to 1998, when highly publicized “victim” and amnesty hearings were held, as well as special hearings on events of significance and on the role of apartheid in civil society. While most of the TRC shut down in 1998, with many commissioners moving on to other positions, the Amnesty Committee processed over seven thousand amnesty applications for five additional years. The TRC thus formally concluded its work in 2003, with the release of its codicil to the “final” 1998 report. Although there are non-governmental (NGO) and grassroots initiatives dedicated to truth, justice, and reconciliation, the TRC is likely moving toward the periphery of mainstream consciousness in a nation that is preoccupied with HIV/AIDS, development, crime, and unemployment.

Although the TRC is over and done with, surely one of the lessons deriving from the process is that the work of national memory and recon-

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conciliation has only just begun. This, the TRC has itself admitted, as it gradually downgraded its opening moral platitudes — that truth is the road to reconciliation, that there is no future without forgiveness, that revealing is healing — to more manageable claims that it had succeeded in reducing the permissible range of lies (to borrow from Ignatieff 1996), in promoting human rights and in initiating national reconciliation. Survey figures during, and subsequent to, the truth commission demonstrate continued ethno-racial splits about how the TRC handled the past and what comprises reconciliation (Gibson and Macdonald 2001; Lombard 2003). Beneficiary denial of responsibility is seen as codependent with superficial notions of reconciliation (Alexander 2002; Villa-Vicencio 1997). The TRC has been criticized for its inability to address localized conflicts and community reconciliation (van der Merwe 1999). The relative absence of women's voices throughout the TRC process has also led to gaps in collective memory (McEwan 2003; Jolly in this special issue of C/AS).

Post-commission South Africa, in other words, has not finished grappling with either its past or the way forward. Of course, "truth" cannot be imposed. Nor can reconciliation be forced, as if dealing with the past resulted in a “finished” consensus on the future. To presume otherwise is to risk lapsing into authoritarian truth, to be seen as imposing identities and directives irrespective of agency and difference. At the same time, however, difference and dissensus ought to be located within an overarching solidarity and a shared commitment to democratic principles and practices [Nagy 2002; Osiel 1997]. Otherwise, the potential for uncivil behaviour, a weak commitment to human rights, or the alienation and marginalisation of sectors of the population may, in the worst scenario, result in violent social rupture: in short, a recurrence of history.

This potential is a problem of both citizenship and transitional justice. Yet, conceptually, citizenship and transitional justice tend to be treated separately. Transitional justice, understood here as truth and reconciliation, typically occurs within a narrow time frame in an effort to (re)construct the moral, legal, and political foundations of democracy. It can be seen as preceding and grounding the enjoyment and practice of citizenship, which is broader in scope and duration than transitional justice. But the relationship need not be treated as linear. Discourses of citizenship can also help drive forward the work commenced by the truth commission. Moreover, the issues, shortcomings, or outcomes of the TRC process do traverse with general struggles around citizenship. The meaning of citizenship in the “new” South Africa requires thinking through the perspective of transitional justice. This claim will be illustrated through the examples of the rise of violent xenophobia in South Africa and the debate over reparations and benefit from historic injustice.
This article attempts to "map" the conceptual relationships between citizenship, on the one hand, and memory and reconciliation, on the other. Collective memory refers to the ongoing sociopolitical construction of "truth" or history. It is a multivocal, moving constellation of public narratives affiliated with the conceptions and interactions of groups and individuals. Reconciliation is intertwined with collective memory; it is best understood as an ethical solidarity or bond that remains respectful of difference. Citizenship is treated in a three-fold manner: (1) equal membership and juridical personhood within a system of rights; (2) democratic ethos and human rights culture; (3) belonging, identity, and solidarity. Overall, I will argue that the "sense of injustice" is a critical touchstone that intersects citizenship, memory, and reconciliation.

**Citizenship and the Sense of Injustice**

The terrain of citizenship has multiple and contested meanings. I will attempt briefly to untangle various strands of thinking and to clarify that which especially pertains here. Harnessing the language of citizenship to transitional justice may appear somewhat incongruous in light of increased theorizing about trends toward denationalized, transnational, or cosmopolitan citizenship. While I cannot address the way that "citizenship" as a whole may be in transition, increasingly "unbounded" forms of citizenship and the nation-building that was such a large part of the TRC can, and do, coexist. Nation and globalisation are interwoven in the xenophobic closing of the nation against the flux of crime, labour, and culture across permeable borders. Conversely, the recent exercise of universal jurisdiction in the US by South Africans plaintiffs seeking apartheid-era reparations illustrates the need for a cosmopolitan push from outside for inclusion within the nation (Nagy 2004a).

In recognizing the porous nature of the nation, however, it is also important to grasp Mbembe's (2000, 265) point that postcolonial boundaries are constituted over "long-term social and cultural processes," which structure sites of contact, negotiation, administration, and resources. Borders have multiple geneses and are not simply juridical lines. Internal boundaries are also significant — whether between black areas and white areas, rural and urban, or homes and hostels — they appear to crystallize race, class, and ethnicity, with further ramifications for women. Although apartheid's internal boundaries have now been juridically erased, spatial differentiation continues to determine access to socioeconomic resources and to frustrate the integration of communities.

Ethno-racial boundaries have often been characterised as creating a "dual citizenship" that bifurcates individual and community, rights and obligations, modernity and tradition, and liberalism and civic-republican-
ism [Ndewga 1997, 602; Halisi, Kaiser and Ndegwa 1998]. In the “new” South Africa, commentators warn of the need to address both racial and ethnic divisions [Mamdani 1996a], to “make non-racial citizenship a popular identity” [Halisi 1998, 424] and to mediate the tension between sex equality and traditional authority [Deveaux 2003]. Ramphele [2001] further suggests there is a basic division between English-speaking liberals, on the one hand, and African and Afrikaner civic-republicans, on the other. The latter are seen as illiberally prizing group loyalty, while the former are seen as demanding rights without being willing to participate in civic life.

In short, alongside the theoretical transition in the “unbounding” of citizenship, there are also competing conceptions of citizenship with which to contend, and multiple divides to be bridged. Responding to these challenges in South Africa, I suggest, requires going beyond “normal” theorizing about citizenship. In the context of transition, the normative presuppositions of citizenship, for example, “an inherited background of settled traditions” [Habermas 1996] where social cooperation takes place “from one generation to the next” [Rawls 1996], are weak or non-existent. Memory and reconciliation have the potential to respond to any such deficits — at least where the acknowledgement of injustice is a significant factor in each.

Citizenship, as noted in the introduction, is comprised of three interrelated arenas: formal rights and membership; democratic ethos and culture; and belonging, identity, and solidarity. This categorization captures both the liberal and civic-republican strands of citizenship. With respect to the liberal dimension, membership and rights establish the legal and institutional relationship between citizens and the state. The relationship between citizens lies more in the civic-republican aspect: citizenship as ethos, identity, and belonging. These two relationships are interdependent, for the formal establishment of rights and equality must also be affirmed in practice.² State actors and institutions are, of course, crucial to this, but democracy also needs citizens who are willing and able to hold the state to account in the face of corruption, bureaucratic indifference, or discriminatory practices [see O’Donnell 1999; Robins and von Lieres in this special issue of C/AS]. This presumes, among other things, a commitment between citizens to treat one another as equals, with civility, respect, and a sense of mutual responsibility.

Judith Shklar’s [1990] work on the sense of injustice is highly instructive in this regard. The sense of injustice refers to the feeling of outrage we experience in the face of the denial of what we feel is due. It cries out, writes Shklar, for “public recognition that it is wrong and unfair to deny anyone a minimum of human dignity” [1990, 90]. In the “normal model,” as she terms it, injustice is the breaking of rules; anything else falls outside the
scope of normal justice. But because justice and injustice are not symmetrical phenomena, we cannot blindly trust the rules of justice to deliver remedy against wrongdoing. As citizens, we must be open to subjective claims of injustice, to hear them out and respond, and to place a check on our own "idealistic" political commitments (Allen 1999, 335-37). Otherwise, we become "arrogant, cruel, and tyrannical" in the face of suffering (Shklar 1990, 27-28).

If active injustice covers "all those vices that mark bad governments," then passive injustice consists of citizens' indifference, evasion, and denial. When bystanders ignore cries that fall outside the "normal" definitions of victimhood, they fall below standards of democratic citizenship (Shklar 1990, 40-41). Elsewhere, Shklar describes the role of active citizens:

These are in fact what we might call decent people.... It is a use of the word citizenship that has no policy implications, but it is an internalized part of a democratic order that relies on the self-direction and responsibility of its citizens rather than on their mere obedience. Whether in public or in private, the good citizen does something to support democratic habits and the constitutional order (1991, 6; emphasis added).

Where the sense of injustice is intact, the formal provisions of citizenship (rights, equal membership) are safeguarded by the active citizenship of decent people.

Although Shklar writes in the American context, the sense of injustice is just as critical, if not more, in the "new" South Africa. Shklar affirms that willingness to act on the sense of injustice is grounded in a democratic ethos: in a respectful capacity to weigh the claims of others, as well as a sense of solidarity and mutual responsibility. The history of apartheid clearly shows that where citizens do not regard one another as worthy of moral respect and minimal standards of decency, there is little to motivate public outcry on behalf of others or reflexive consideration about one's own political commitments. The dehumanising nature of apartheid facilitated blindness to the suffering of others, particularly when suffering was inflicted under the cover of law. Racial hierarchy, ethnic stratification, and the criminalization of political dissent eroded the sense of injustice such that victims were seen as less than human, as vicious criminals, or, in the case of the forced removal of "black spots," as unfortunate obstacles in the implementation of policy.

The renewal of the sense of injustice is, therefore, foundational to moral and democratic (re)construction in South Africa. Certainly, the TRC should be understood as aiming to renew the sense of injustice, most generally in its public exposure of the "truth" of apartheid violence. The TRC consistently sought to embed ideals of citizenship (albeit implicitly) in its
message of reconciliation: that South Africans must reconceive themselves as moral and political equals, each entitled to rights and dignity, within a "healed" nation committed to "never again" repeat the past. Public dialogue about the past sometimes helped to instigate democratic habits (Gutmann and Thompson 2000). And, most especially, the TRC's victim-centred efforts to achieve "justice as recognition" affirmed the juridical equality of victims and recognized them as "legitimate sources of truth" (du Toit 2000, 136; Allen 1999). This reinforces the Shklarian point that we must be open to subjective claims of injustice because formal rules and procedures are never sufficient guarantees of equal moral worth.

The TRC succeeded in drawing a "moral bottom line" (Maier 2000, 267) insofar as very few now deny or condone that the apartheid state engaged in covert and illegal violence. Yet, beyond this, there is little agreement about the nature of past violence or what reconciliation should look like or require. There is still widely racialized disagreement about whether whites benefited and continue to benefit from apartheid, and South Africans are quite split on how well the country has handled reconciliation (Lombard 2003). Key leaders, such as Buthelezi and de Klerk, have denied responsibility for apartheid-era violations, while the ANC, in blatant contravention of the TRC legislation, applied for a collective amnesty. South Africans report fair-to-high levels of distrust in all political institutions, including the police and army (Bratton et al. 2004, 35). The rainbow nation, Neville Alexander suggests, is at present "no more than ornamental" (2002, 82). Despite widespread identification as South Africans (Mattes 2002, 29), the politics of identity remains volatile with incidents of violence, social mistrust and alienation, growing intraracial inequality, and recriminatory political accusations of playing the "race card."

Against these somewhat bleak observations, it should be emphasized that however imperfect democratic life in South Africa might be, there is no danger of collapse. In ten years, South Africa has moved from the threat of civil war to being a relatively peaceful and free democracy with a strong civil society, an independent judiciary, and some degree of social upliftment. Thus, the fostering of citizenship in South Africa pertains to the quality of democracy. My aim in bringing notions of memory and reconciliation into discourses of citizenship is to provide a conceptual path for deepening democracy. Using the examples of xenophobia and the reparations debate to illustrate problems of citizenship, I argue that the memory of apartheid injustice is hereto deficient. An underlying binding question is also raised, following Shklar's idea (quoted above) that decent, active citizens have internalized part of the democratic order. The question is: given the democratic commitment to difference and dissensus, how deeply should the new "citizenship ethic" bite into one's moral identity? This has long been a chal-
lenge for political theory, but it is arguably heightened in the context of apartheid's violent construction of identity and exclusion.

**Re-membering Injustice**

The mantra of transitional justice is to "break with the past," whereas historical continuity is traditionally considered to be an important feature of democratic polities. The temporal dimensions of citizenship are seen to relate to conceptions of political culture; cohesion and stability are grounded in a shared democratic tradition and commitments to a future common good (Bauböck 1998). However, in a nation with a history of violence, division, and injustice, there is a limited tradition from which to draw (although there may be a democratic tradition in resistance). There is political theory about the transition from *modus vivendi* arrangements, based on self-interest and balances of force, to a more enduring citizen ethic that provides a "spirit" of support to formal arrangements (for example, Rawls 1996, 163-65). These foresee a democratic ethos (respect, reflexivity, and more participatory virtues) emerging from the practice of citizenship over time such that the "fiction" of forced civility eventually becomes fair and reasonable fact (Osiel 1997).

I suggest that practice is important but insufficient. Here is where citizenship theory needs to link with transitional justice. Practice implies an exclusive orientation toward present and future interaction that risks amnesia about the past. And democratic transition cannot rely upon some presumed belief that institutions are just or that the sense of injustice is intact. These things must be consciously worked toward. "Truth" processes help to (re)construct a shared fund of moral intuitions by reinterpreting and condemning past events (see Teitel 2000, 71). Yet, I will argue, this cannot be construed solely as a matter of "breaking with the past." There is also something to citizenship's claim of historical continuity.

**Apartheid and Xenophobia**

To explain, I will start with the rise of xenophobic intolerance, which includes a number of fatal attacks against "illegal aliens" by both citizens and state officials. This egregious failure to respect human rights belies the commitment to "never again" and *ubuntu*. A decidedly undemocratic ethos is emerging around the question of rights and membership in the "new" South Africa. Certainly, South Africa is not alone in its trend toward autochtony; its tightening of borders takes place within postcolonial and globalising stresses upon state sovereignty (Comaroff and Comaroff 2001). Yet the pervasive hostility toward foreigners shows remarkably little cognizance of the apartheid past. As Valji (2003) writes,

The negation of the humanity and rights of an "inferior" popula-
tion group have their roots in the legacy of the apartheid past of this country, which has contributed not only to levels of xenophobia, but also to their violent nature ... [the] discourse of deportation and forced removal [represents] a harkening back to the dark days of apartheid.... Notions of exclusionary citizenship; the construction of social divisions and "hierarchies of prejudice"; the construction of threats and a security paradigm that is based on a "laager mentality"; and the normalisation of violence as a conflict-resolution response all have roots in the policies and practices of the past.

The past rears its head in approval for stipulations that all foreigners carry identification (Valji 2003), in the arbitrary power of investigation officers (SAHRC 2000), and in incidents where "darker" South Africans undergo a "dehumanising" test to "prove" their South Africanness (Dludlu 2000). The apparent inability or unwillingness to recognize and resist the apartheid past in the "new" South Africa is particularly striking, considering that millions of South Africans were denationalized and suffered under the migrant labour system. All this suggests that the renewal of the sense of injustice has been somewhat limited.

This deficiency in collective memory should be connected in at least some degree to the narrowness of the TRC's mandate. Early on, Mamdani (1996b) raised the influential critique that insofar as the system of apartheid factored into the TRC's account, it was generally as the wider context of gross violations, rather than as the crime itself. There was limited examination of forced removals, pass laws, the migrant system and influx control, or the internal divides these created. The TRC also did not cover the apartheid state's violent destabilization of Mozambique, Namibia, or Angola; consequently, there is also little recognition of the duties that South Africa might owe to its neighbouring states and their citizens (Valji 2003). Although the TRC cannot reasonably be blamed for factors beyond its mandate or control, it is tempting to say that given its limits, it is no small wonder that the "new" South Africa appears largely indifferent to the rights of "illegal aliens" and deaf to the echoes of apartheid in its treatment of them.

The instructive point is that the meaning of citizenship in the "new" South Africa requires thinking through the past. This means not only remembering patterns of historic injustice, but also recognizing such patterns in the present. The stories told today about foreigners — that they are criminals, that they take jobs, that they carry HIV/AIDS — are not so new in their underlying message that certain segments of the population are unworthy of dignified treatment. If the "newfound" commitment to protect moral dignity and human rights were more strongly coupled with memories of violent inequality, surely a more robust check against the
indecent treatment of "outsiders" would develop. In other words, the sense of injustice is limited when memory of the full extent of violence fails to carry through into the present. Collective memory should not treat the past as over but, rather, as "simultaneously discontinuous and intertwined" with the present (Teitel 2000, 70-71). This means not only remembering patterns of historic injustice, but also recognizing and acting against such patterns in the present.

**Reparations and Historic Obligations**

The limited renewal of the sense of injustice is also evident in the debate over reparations and obligations deriving from historic benefit. The government has been harshly criticized for its five-year delay in announcing a reparations policy that falls far short of TRC recommendations. The delay, ostensibly due to the extended amnesty hearings, jeopardized the rule of law insofar as the Constitutional Court had, in 1996, upheld the legitimacy of amnesty on the basis of truth and reparation. Moreover, it seemed palpably unfair that victims had to wait while amnestied perpetrators walked away immediately. While the government was perhaps motivated by a feeling that the struggle against apartheid was not about money, its indifferent treatment to those most victimized under apartheid is not encouraging. The sense of injustice militates against cruelty, but as the TRC wrote in its follow-up report:

To ignore the suffering of those found by the Commission to be victims would be a particular kind of cruelty. After all, it was the testimony of these victims that gave us a window onto how others saw the past and allowed us to construct an image of the future (2003, 6: 160). Nation-building may have relied upon victims' testimony to unite all South Africans, but the delayed and unsatisfactory reparation left them at the periphery of the nation, undermining citizenship as belonging.

The reparations story continues with civil litigation recently lodged (in the United States) by the Khulumani Support Group against multinational companies for "aiding and abetting" in the crime of apartheid and other *jus cogens* violations. While the case has now been dismissed, it nonetheless succeeded in raising the stakes in the debate over obligations deriving from historic benefit. During the TRC's public hearings on the role of apartheid in civil society, many businesses submitted, incredulously, that they had been victims, rather than benefactors, of racial capitalism. Today, there is still largely a refusal to take responsibility: contributions to the Business Trust fund made are on condition that these are called "nation-building," rather than reparation (Terreblanche 2003). This explicit stance may be indicative of a more general position among South African whites. Survey measurements appear to confirm what Verwoerd (2000) has termed "deep-
seated restitutinal reluctance” on the part of apartheid beneficiaries (Lombard 2003; Gibson and Macdonald 2001). Complaints of reverse racism and a retreat to the language of colour-blindness, rather than redress and difference, appear wholly disconnected from the past. This is not to endorse the moralizing notion of reconciliation that depends upon “thick” consensus, yet reconciliation as the co-existence of communities problematically implies separateness and denial (Nagy 2004c).

**Citizenship, Memory, and Reconciliation**

Several observations arise from the above. The first is that collective memory must involve the reconstruction of temporal continuity; it cannot simply break with the past. Recognition of past injustice and its continuing impact will deepen the sense of injustice, mutual responsibility, and solidarity. The narrow focus on gross human rights violations during the TRC limited the renewal of the sense of injustice. Moreover, the TRC insufficiently traced how extraordinary violence was inscribed within the ordinary violence of ethno-racial stratification, differential privilege, and dehumanization, thereby dissociating terror from benefit (Nagy 2004b). With the public spotlight on perpetrators such as “Prime Evil” Eugene de Kock, and with prominence placed on magnanimous and forgiving victims, beneficiaries were left to engage in a superficial reckoning of the past. The TRC’s sweeping in and out of different towns was also fairly superficial to communities recovering from so-called “black on black” violence. Thus, if citizenship as a shared enterprise is to be deepened after the TRC, this will depend in some part upon memory work oriented toward an enhanced sense of injustice.

Second, collective memory of injustice must negotiate between vilification, denial, and “the hyperinflation of victimhood” (Osiel 1997, 146). History has often been used as a criterion of exclusion for citizenship; thus, the question of “whose history” is an important one (Bader 1995). Maier’s notion of “contrapuntal history” is useful in this respect: “the particular histories of national groups [are] woven together linearly alongside each other so that the careful listener can follow them distinctly but simultaneously, hearing the whole together with the parts” (2000, 275). The construction of multivocal memory, however, does not morally equate different perspectives with one another. Rather, it is a deliberative process, where citizens increasingly come to respect the differing views of others and to reflect critically on the myths and stereotypes that once seemed constitutive of the identity of self and “other” (Osiel 1997, 178).

From this, it follows, thirdly, that where citizenship ties into the memory of injustice, it also intersects with questions of identity and belonging. On this front, I think that Dwyer’s (1999) understanding of
reconciliation as "narrative equilibrium" provides a helpful illustration of how this "weaving" of memory comes about. She suggests that we tend to think of reconciliation as generally involving tensions, such as between two or more different interpretations of events. But reconciliation, as with multivocal memory, does not involve the total elimination of tensions. Rather, the tensions are incorporated into a new narrative, and people find a way to live with it. While Dwyer presents this as a "realist" account, it is also based on a "leap of faith" that "the future is nothing if not full of possibility" (Dwyer 1999, 93).

Identity in Dwyer's (1999, 86) understanding is a constructed narrative; self-conceptions are embedded in the "relevant stories" we tell ourselves about the world and our place in it. When the sociohistorical background to our stories is disrupted, as with the end of apartheid, revision is necessary for psychological and moral coherence. "Narrative equilibrium" provides this coherence. The new narrative "encompasses both the atrocities of apartheid and the hope for a peaceful, respectful coexistence of political equals" (Dwyer 1999, 92). Not all parties need settle on a single interpretation, but the task is to work toward mutually acceptable accommodation. On this view, argues Dwyer, it is "not impossible" for black South Africans to see white South Africans "as having been oppressors and being fellow citizens" (1999, 92). (This conception could also be extended to community level reconciliation.)

The normative shift to "being fellow citizens," however, calls for some kind of bond, which Dwyer does not explicate. Her account must also be clearly distinguished from wholly forward-looking notions of reconciliation. I suggest that the idea of community as "shared fate" can fulfill this role. As Williams (2003, 231) writes, citizenship as shared fate means "seeing our own narratives as entwined with those of others." Members of a community of shared fate are bound together by their interdependence and mutual impact; indeed, there is in South Africa "no plausible alternative to living together" (Williams 1999, 229). The legitimacy of this interdependence must come from the reciprocal justification of material and institutional linkages and through relationships of cooperation and impact. Williams writes:

"This suggests that having a sense of ourselves as members of a community of fate entails telling ourselves (true) stories about how we came to be connected to particular other human beings, and believing that we are responsible for constructing that connection in a manner that is justifiable to them. Telling those stories truthfully and conscientiously, in a manner that acknowledges others' perspectives on past and future, requires effort and intentionality. So too does recognizing the danger that important narratives may have been overlooked or

A constructive integration of Williams and Dwyer's complementary ideas provides a promising view of the relationship between memory, reconciliation, and citizenship. Both draw attention to the importance of recognizing that citizen identity is constructed within interconnections and structures not necessarily of our choosing. They offer resolutions that are psychologically possible for individuals, while also being cognizant of the interpenetration of identity and sociohistorical conditions, and morally respectful of diversity and difference. I am largely sympathetic to this view, especially given the static, constructed nature of identity under apartheid. In breaking with the past, South Africa should not mimic historic practices of identity imposition. These two accounts are valuable in that they avoid all-encompassing, "thick" understandings of citizenship and reconciliation.

Yet I also wonder if this "hands-off" approach to identity will, in fact, be sufficient. Williams argues that citizens may or may not positively value their interconnection: all that is required is that one "observes the practice of reciprocity" (1999, 232). But this does not tell us how citizens come to tell themselves "truthful" stories about their historical interconnections. Perpetrators who came before the TRC, for example, engaged in the practice of reciprocity by recognizing the new state — even as they denied remorse or responsibility for their actions. Although Williams is clear that citizenship as shared fate does require the avoidance of passive injustice, she places too much misplaced faith in the "remarkable capacities" that people have for "compartmentalizing their moral lives" (1999, 234). For it was precisely this capacity that enabled beneficiaries to dissociate themselves from apartheid terror and to abdicate moral responsibility for "wicked" law.

Nor does the emphasis on practice over moral identity tell us much about how people come to understand themselves as members of a community of shared fate. We should not entirely dismiss the necessity of a common, "internalised" citizen identity. Simply being South African is not enough because it facilitates a xenophobic construction of the nation, and it has thus far provided little more than a veneer of harmony for members of the nation. The citizen ethic should "bite" into moral identity at least insofar as race and ethnicity are recognized as part of a deliberate historical project. Identity revision is a process of recognizing the contingent and relational character of identity and of learning through others' perceptions of history (Steyn 2001). Even minimal notions of community of shared fate will not be nurtured if people simply tune out memories of injustice — and the fate of injustice's trajectory — that they do not want to hear.

Thus, a community of shared fate does require an ethical bond. This is not to insist upon a singular orientation toward citizenship, which risks
marginalizing groups that are found to be wanting (Williams 2003, 219-21). Flexibility is important, but it also requires a common ethical underpinning. I intend this fairly minimally, as the sense of injustice. Renewing the sense of injustice does require some moral revision at the level of identity. Collective memory speaks to the stories we tell ourselves about the past in light of the present, and the stories we tell ourselves about the present in light of the past. The memory of injustice is not univocal, but individual narratives and self-conceptions are revised and woven within the larger framework. And, surely, the history of apartheid teaches that the rights and ethos of citizenship depend upon solidarity, inclusion, and mutual responsibility. Citizens need not value their interconnection for the same reasons or to the same degree. Perhaps resignation to inevitable ties is the most that some South Africans can do. But this should not preclude the hope of a future, where “being fellow citizens” entails positively valued belonging and interdependence.

Conclusion
Although the Truth and Reconciliation Commission has come to end, the endeavours of memory and reconciliation might be continued and strengthened by integrating them with discourses of citizenship in the “new” South Africa. However, typical conceptions of citizenship tend to neglect the importance of transitional processes of moral and democratic (re)construction. Thus, in this paper, I have initiated a theoretical “mapping” of the relationship between collective memory and citizenship as membership, rights, ethos, and belonging, as well as between reconciliation and citizenship as ethos, identity, and solidarity. These multiple categories intersect, with the memory and sense of injustice as the linchpin. The sense of injustice precludes the imposition of thick collective identities, but it also necessitates ethical bonds of mutual responsibility and positively valued interdependence. In this view, reconciliation looks both backward and forward.

Notes
1 Transitional justice, of course, comprises many elements. I limit my remarks in the South African context to truth and reconciliation. I cannot address amnesty here.
2 My conception of citizenship responds to the call of Halisi, Kaiser and Ndegwa (1998) to move beyond the liberal / civic-republican dichotomy in the study of citizenship in sub-Saharan Africa. For reasons of space, I cannot expand here, but the sense of injustice provides the conceptual link.
3 Note that Shklar’s concern in American Citizenship is the “enormous impact” of black chattel slavery (1).
4 Xenophobia is deeply systemic and pervasive (see Crush and Pendleton 2004). See
the South African Human Rights Commission (2000) report on the “intolerable conditions” and lack of accountability in the Lindela detention centre for undocumented migrants. Undocumented workers are systematically exploited and subject to harassment and extortion [Harris 2001]. Violent incidents include the murder of two Senegalese and a Mozambican by a mob in 1998. In 2000, six white police officers in a “training exercise” unleashed their dogs for a brutal mauling of three Mozambicans.

5 For a more sceptical view, see Ignatieff (1996).

Bibliography


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